Susquehanna’s $868B Reported 13F Value Is Really an Options Market-Making Footprint

TL;DR

• Susquehanna International Group reported $868.03B of Q4 2025 13F value across 13,927 positions, but that headline should be read as market-making inventory and hedging exposure, not classic long-only capital.
• SPY ranked first at $77.35B or 9.57% of the filing, while CUSIP 04609E107 maps to Invesco QQQ Trust and ranked second at $42.88B, reinforcing the idea that index and ETF exposure dominates the book.
• Susquehanna publicly describes itself as a quantitative trading firm that trades its own capital with a focus on derivatives and ETF market making. That makes large lines in Tesla, NVIDIA, Meta, and Apple more useful as signals about options flow than about long-term conviction.

Susquehanna’s Q4 2025 filing is one of the easiest 13Fs to misread. On the surface, it looks like a giant equity portfolio with mega-cap tech and ETF concentration. In practice, it looks much more like the disclosed hedge sleeve of a firm whose core business is providing liquidity in options, ETFs, and listed equities. That distinction matters because the same SPY position can mean very different things in the hands of an index fund, a mutual fund, or a derivatives market maker.

Why the $868B figure needs translation

Susquehanna’s own website says the firm trades its own capital at its own risk, is one of the world’s largest options market participants, and is a leading ETF market maker. That profile is very different from a traditional institutional manager that buys stocks to express multi-quarter views. For a market maker, large disclosed longs can arise from delta hedging, ETF creation-redemption activity, dispersion trading, and day-to-day inventory management.

That is why this article uses reported 13F value instead of treating the filing like a clean measure of investable long-only capital. A classic asset manager’s 13F is usually a rough window into client capital allocated to long U.S. equities. Susquehanna’s filing is better read as a partial snapshot of a much larger trading machine where listed equity positions support derivatives activity happening elsewhere on the balance sheet.

CUSIP 04609E107 is almost certainly QQQ, not a mystery single-stock bet

The most important line in the filing may be the one that looks opaque. CUSIP 04609E107 maps to Invesco QQQ Trust, the ETF behind one of the deepest index and single-name options ecosystems in the U.S. market. Once that line is translated, Susquehanna’s top of book makes much more sense: SPY at #1, QQQ at #2, TSLA at #3, then NVDA, META, and AAPL.

That mix looks exactly like what you would expect from a firm that specializes in exchange-listed equity, index, and ETF options. It is not a hidden stock-picking portfolio. It is a list of the products and underlyings where listed options activity, ETF arbitrage, and liquidity provision are deepest.

Why GLD in the top 10 is unusual — and still consistent with the business model

SPDR Gold Shares at $16.97B is the line that makes this filing look strange if you approach it like a classic long-only portfolio. Gold is not usually a top-10 core position for a broad equity manager. For a market maker, though, GLD is a liquid ETF with active options and macro-event trading demand. In that framework, a large gold ETF line is not a surprise conviction call on bullion. It is more likely part of an inventory and hedging stack built around customer activity and cross-asset risk management.

The same logic applies to IWM. Small-cap index exposure is useful not because Susquehanna is making a classic factor allocation, but because Russell 2000 options and ETF liquidity create repeatable hedging demand. The filing therefore says more about where liquidity was needed than where a discretionary PM wanted to make a long-duration bet.

The jump from $572B to $868B does not mean client capital jumped 52%

Susquehanna’s reported 13F value rose from $572B in Q3 2024 to $868B in Q4 2025, a gain of roughly 51.7% across five quarters. For a traditional manager, that kind of move might prompt questions about fundraising, equity-market beta, or concentrated winners. For Susquehanna, the cleaner interpretation is more mechanical: more options activity, larger hedge inventory, richer equity prices in the largest underlyings, and heavier ETF creation-redemption flow can all lift the disclosed long book without implying a one-for-one increase in economic capital.

That reading also fits the rest of the filing. A 13,927-position book with only 27.2% in the top five and 37.4% in the top 10 looks enormous, but it does not look like a classic conviction portfolio. It looks like a distributed exposure map of the listed-options ecosystem.

How investors should actually use this filing

Susquehanna’s 13F is still valuable. You just need to ask the right question. Instead of asking, “What stocks does Susquehanna love?” the better questions are:

• Which products dominate U.S. options and ETF liquidity right now?
• Where is hedging demand clustering: SPY, QQQ, TSLA, NVDA, or GLD?
• How does Susquehanna’s footprint compare with other market-structure-heavy filers on 13F Insight’s research hub?
• What does the breadth of the filing suggest about overall listed-market activity rather than about stock-picking conviction?

If you read the filing through that lens, the headline number becomes less misleading and more useful. The story is not that Susquehanna suddenly turned into a giant traditional asset manager. The story is that Q4 2025 left a very large disclosed footprint in the equity and ETF instruments most tightly linked to options market making.

For the full holdings view, start on Susquehanna’s filer page, then drill into the underlying products such as SPY, QQQ, TSLA, NVDA, GLD, and IWM.